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Deposit-Refund on Labor:
A Solution to Equilibrium Unemployment?
BEN J. HEIJDRA and JENNY E. LIGTHART*
The paper studies the employment effects of a deposit-refund scheme on labor
in a simple search-theoretic model of the labor market. It is shown that if a firm
pays a deposit when it fires a worker, to be refunded when it employs the same
or another worker, the vacancy rate increases and the unemployment rate
declines. The scheme introduces rigidities in the labor market, however, which
may be undesirable in countries wanting to liberalize their labor
markets. [JEL J3, J68]
S
ome people return empty bottles to the store because they find littering and
nonrecycling unacceptable from an environmental point of view. Many people,
however, are motivated to return the bottles only because there is money to be
made in the form of a deposit that is refunded. The literature on environmental
economics has shown that these deposit-refund schemes are efficient instruments
to deal with the negative environmental externalities resulting from illicit
dumping.1 If unemployment is considered to create negative externalities,2 one
could argue for using a deposit-refund system in the labor market. Why not have
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the firm pay a deposit when it fires a worker, to be refunded when it (re-) hires that
or another worker?
A deposit-refund scheme on labor is essentially a tax on firing an employee
matched by a subsidy on hiring a (new) worker. The deposit acts as a “stick” by
providing an incentive to move away from socially “undesirable” behavior,
whereas the refund acts as a “carrot” by providing an incentive to move toward
“desirable” behavior. By seeking such a policy mix, one can contain the fiscal
implications of hiring subsidies; firing taxes reduce firms’ incentives to lay off
workers and generate government revenues to (partly) finance public spending on
hiring subsidies. Schemes that rely solely on hiring subsidies to boost employment
may encourage firms to generate high labor turnover—assuming that the subsidy
exceeds the recruitment and training costs to the firm—with a view to securing a
net gain. Fay (1996) argues that close monitoring in employment-subsidy
programs is important to make sure that subsidies are not used to replace subsi-
dized workers whose subsidy has ended nor to recruit workers for recently created
temporary vacancies.
The present proposal is not merely academic. Recently, Tilburg University has
implemented a subsidy-penalty scheme with a view to increase the proportion of
female associate and full professors among its staff. When a new female professor
is recruited by a department, the Board of the University disburses a subsidy of
75,000 guilders to that department, which has to pay a penalty of the same amount
when a female professor quits or is laid off.3 This measure was introduced to
replace a 50,000-guilder hiring subsidy on female professors, which was not
successful because of high quit rates.
This paper analyzes the long-run unemployment effects of deposit-refund
schemes on labor. To this end, a modified version of Pissarides’ (1990) search-
theoretic model of the labor market is employed. This framework allows for
flows in the labor market from the creation of new jobs and the (exogenous)
destruction of superfluous jobs. It assumes a search process in which firms
offering vacancies and unemployed job-seeking workers are brought together
in a stochastic fashion. In this type of model, vacancies and unemployment
occur simultaneously in equilibrium. Pissarides’ model thus differs radically
from the aggregate (classical) labor market model in which only unemployed
workers (vacancies) are observed when the wage is above (below) its equilib-
rium value. The model features a search externality that is represented by
agents’ contact probabilities as a function of labor market tightness: the pres-
ence of an additional firm with a vacancy makes it easier for workers to find
jobs but harder for firms to fill vacancies. Similarly, an additional unemployed
worker makes it more difficult for workers to locate jobs but easier for vacan-
cies to be filled with workers. 
So far, the literature on unemployment policy has not studied deposit-refund
systems in the context of labor markets.4 There exists, however, a substantial liter-
3Contrary to the above description, the Tilburg scheme applies to both layoffs and quits. 
4In an accompanying paper Heijdra and Ligthart (2002) study a hiring subsidy cum firing tax in a
fully specified macroeconomic model with search externalities.ature on hiring subsidies, on the one hand, and firing costs on the other. Informal
discussions on the beneficial employment effects of hiring subsidies can be found
in Fay (1996), Martin (1998), OECD (1994, 2000), and Phelps (1997). The earlier
theoretical literature on employment subsidies, which assumes a clearing labor
market and homogeneous labor, stresses their employment-enhancing effect,5 but
has neglected the government’s budget constraint. Recently, Martin (1998) and the
OECD (2000) have informally discussed the fiscal and employment implications
of various labor subsidies taking into account the heterogeneity of labor. Formal
treatments of labor subsidy policies in a search-theoretic context are developed by
Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2001). They show
that hiring subsidies reduce unemployment duration, but have an ambiguous effect
on the unemployment rate.6
The theoretical literature on firing costs—with central contributions including
Bertola (1990, 1992), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), and Booth (1997)—generally
finds that employment protection provisions reduce the variation of employment
over the business cycle, but the effect on the average level of employment is
ambiguous. Firing costs create disincentives for firms wanting to fire workers but
also discourage hiring because of the discounted costs of possible firing in the
future. Bertola (1992) shows that when discount and attrition rates are positive, the
average employment effect of firing costs depends on its effect on the marginal
product of labor (which is negative), as well as the relative slopes of the labor
demand curve in booms and slumps. He argues that if hiring and firing cycles are
long—in which case attrition and discount rates are large and thus the present
discounted value of firing costs small—employment may increase. However, no
consensus has been reached yet in the empirical literature on the employment
effects of firing costs (see Hunt, 1994). 
The model at hand shows that deposits and refunds on labor push up
economy-wide wages, increase the vacancy rate, and reduce the equilibrium rate
of unemployment. Intuitively, the scheme provides an implicit subsidy (that is, the
interest earned on the “deposit”) to firms hiring new employees. The model gives
a very stylized description of the labor market, however; employees work (full
time) during their entire life, they do not voluntarily quit jobs, and workers are
either employed or unemployed, in which case they are looking for a job. As the
discussion section argues, if firms can freely set working hours, deposit-refund
schemes on labor are likely to induce firms experiencing bad business conditions
to impose shorter working hours on their workforce as a substitute for firing them.
Accordingly, the variance of employment over the business cycle is stabilized.




5Experiments with employment subsidies in the United States and Italy—as reported in Woodbury and
Spiegelman (1987) and Felli and Ichino (1988)—have generally been successful in increasing employment.
6These papers extend Pissarides’ (1990) framework by endogenizing the job destruction process.
Because their analytical framework yields indeterminate employment effects of hiring subsidies, this
paper employs the much simpler Pissarides model, which assumes a fixed job destruction rate. As a result,
the model cannot take into account firms’ incentives to replace nonsubsidized employees by subsidized
(the so-called displacement effect). I. A Search Model of the Labor Market 
Suppose that there is a fixed labor force, L, of which a fraction u is unemployed
per unit of time.7 The flow into unemployment originates from an exogenous job
destruction process that causes a proportion s of occupied jobs to dissolve.
Separations may be caused by structural shifts in demand or by changes in produc-
tivity and are interpreted as “firing” because in equilibrium workers strictly prefer
employment to unemployment. Only unemployed laborers search for a job, thus
excluding on-the-job search by workers. Likewise, the firm is not searching for
workers to replace incumbent (but unsatisfactory) workers. Vacancies are created
by new firms or by incumbent firms reopening previously destroyed jobs.
At each instant of time, uL unemployed workers and vL vacancies on offer
engage in a stochastic matching process, where v is the vacancy rate. The number
of successful matches depends on the number of unemployed workers, U ≡ uL,
and the total number of vacancies, V ≡ vL, according to the following matching
function:
(1)
where xL is the total number of matches, x denotes the matching rate, and G(.,.) is
a linearly homogeneous function. By defining g ≡ xL/V = x/v, the matching func-
tion can be rewritten to yield g = g(θ ), with g (θ ) < 0.8 The probability that a firm
finds a worker in the time interval dt is given by g(θ )dt, where θ≡ V/U denotes the
vacancy-unemployment rate, which is a measure of labor market tightness. Then,
the expected duration of a vacancy is given by 1/g(θ ). Similarly, f(θ ) ≡θ g(θ ) is the
probability of an unemployed worker finding a job, so that 1/f(θ ) is the expected
duration of an unemployment spell.
In the aggregate, unemployment evolves according to the difference between
the average number of unemployed workers who find a job, that is f(θ )uLdt, and
the average number of workers entering the unemployment pool, s(1 – u)Ldt. This
yields the following equilibrium rate of unemployment:
(2)
which is strictly greater than zero. 
Wages are taken as given during the search process. After an individual worker
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7This section builds on Pissarides (1990), which is amended to allow for a deposit-refund scheme
on labor.
8Job-seeking workers flow out of the unemployment pool according to a Poisson process with rate x/v.Firm Behavior
Assume that there are many risk-neutral firms, each of which has one job that is
either filled or vacant. If the job is filled, the representative firm rents physical
capital, k, at the constant rate of interest,9 r, to produce output according to a
constant returns-to-scale production function, F(k,1), which satisfies the usual
properties. If the job is vacant, the firm actively searches for a suitable worker and
is incurring search cost, γ 0, per unit of time.
Suppose that a firm hiring a worker receives a fixed one-off subsidy of b from
the government, but when it fires that worker it must pay a tax of b. This is like a
variant—in fact, the reverse—of a cash-refund scheme on bottles where
consumers have to pay a fixed amount on buying a filled bottle and receive a
refund (set at the same rate) when the empty bottle is properly disposed of.10 In
the model, it is assumed that workers do not voluntarily quit jobs (in which case
the firm would not need to pay a firing tax).
Let JF and JV denote the present value of profits of a firm with a filled job and
a vacancy, respectively. Assume perfect capital markets so that firms can borrow
freely at the market rate of interest. Then, the following arbitrage equation can be
derived for a firm having a vacancy:
(3)
Equation (3) says that the capital cost of the firm, rJV, should equal the firm’s
expected return on investment, which consists of two parts: (i) the fixed-search
costs that are incurred per time unit; and (ii) the expected capital gain when it finds
a worker. The latter is equal to the sum of the gain in present value from filling the
vacancy (that is, JF – JV ) and the subsidy payment received from the government,
weighted by the probability of finding a suitable candidate. The number of
firms/jobs is determined by the zero-profit condition—free entry and exit of firms
will occur until all profit opportunities from new vacancies are equal to zero. This
implies the following expression for the present value of an occupied job:
(4)
Equations (3)–(4) show that b acts like an implicit subsidy to firms with a vacancy:
the expected search costs, γ 0/g(θ ), are reduced by the subsidy payment received
from the government. 
JJ g b VF =⇒ = ( ) − 0 0 γθ / .
rJ g J b J VF V =− + ( ) +− [] γθ 0 .
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9Assuming a small open economy for which the world rate of interest is given.
10In case of a deposit-refund on labor, the firm is the buyer of the services of the nonreproducible
commodity “labor.” Then, the firm receives a subsidy if it hires one unit of labor, while in the case of
bottles the firm supplies the reproducible commodity (bottled beverages) at a fixed charge. For a firm with a filled job, the steady-state arbitrage equation reads as follows:
(5)
where w denotes the wage rate and δ is the rate of depreciation. The left-hand side
of equation (5) represents the expected return on an occupied job, which is
composed of the surplus created in production and the expected capital loss owing
to job destruction (that is, s(JF + b)). If the job is destroyed, the firm not only loses
the value of the occupied job, but must also pay back the deposit on its worker to
the government. Since the job destruction rate, s, is exogenous, the firm can do
nothing to reduce the probability of an adverse job-destroying shock. 
The firm chooses the amount of capital it wants to rent such that the value of
the firm is maximized:
(6)
This yields the usual condition equating the marginal product of capital to the
rental charge on capital:
(7)
and the marginal condition for labor:
(8)
where N is employment and subscripts denote partial derivatives. Equation (8)
shows that labor receives less than its marginal product, owing to the positive
search costs.11 However, the capital value of the deposit acts like a subsidy on the
use of labor. 
Worker Behavior
Workers are homogeneous, live forever, and are risk-neutral. Therefore, they care
only about the expected discounted value of their income. It is assumed that each
worker with a job supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Let YE and YU denote the










Fk r k ,, 1 ( ) =+ δ
Max
k
F rs J F k r kws b
{}
+ ( ) ≡ ( ) −+ ( ) −− ,. 1 δ
rJ F k r k w s J b FF = ( ) −+ ( ) −− + [] ,, 1 δ
Ben J.Heijdra and Jenny E.Ligthart
598
11Note that (r + s)JF = FN(k,1) – w – sb. Equation (8) is obtained by using this result in equation (4). employed worker and an unemployed worker. An unemployed worker receives an
exogenously given income, z, during his or her search and expects to move into a
job with probability f(θ ).12 Then, the following steady-state arbitrage condition
can be derived for a worker without a job:
(9)
The arbitrage condition says that the return on human capital of an unemployed
worker during search—that is, the reservation wage13—should equal expected
income, which consists of the imputed value of leisure and the capital gain from
finding a job. 
A worker with a job earns a wage, w, and loses that job at an exogenous rate
s. Then, in steady state, permanent income of an employed worker, rYE, should
equal expected income, which exceeds wage income to compensate for the risk of
becoming unemployed (and suffer a capital loss of YE – YU ):
(10)
Solving equations (9) and (10) yields expressions for YE and YU:
(11)
where the first expression shows that for anybody to be willing to search for a job,
wages need to exceed the imputed value of leisure. 
Wage Setting
When an unemployed worker and a firm offering a vacancy meet, a pure economic
rent is created by the encounter, which is equal to the sum of the expected (net)
search costs of the worker and the firm. Upon separation this rent will be lost. The
division of the rent of a particular firm-worker pairing i is a matter of bargaining
over the wage rate, wi. Using the Nash bargaining solution, the wage rate is set
such that the weighted sum of the worker’s and firm’s net returns is maximized
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12This may represent the imputed value of leisure or income earned in the hidden economy.
13This could also be interpreted as the household’s permanent income: the amount the unemployed
worker can consume without running down his or her capital.(12)
where the coefficient β  (0 ≤β≤ 1) can be interpreted as a measure of the worker’s
bargaining strength and YU and JV are the “threat points” of the worker and the
firm, respectively. The rent-sharing rule derived from (12) is given by:
(13)
This yields the following wage equation for worker i:14
(14)
In symmetric equilibrium, each firm with an occupied job chooses the same
capital stock, that is, k = ki. Accordingly, all workers are equally productive so that
the wage rate is the same for all worker-firm pairs, w = wi. Using equations (13),
(9), and (14), the reservation wage can be written as rYU = z +βθγ 0/(1 – β ). Now,
by combining this with equation (4), the aggregate wage equation follows:
(15)
The economy-wide wage is a weighted average of the imputed value of leisure and
the firm’s surplus, which consists of the marginal productivity of labor, the
expected search costs that are saved if a deal is struck, and the implicit subsidy on
labor. Accordingly, the deposit rate pushes economy-wide wages up.
II. Model Solution and Allocation Effects
Market Equilibrium and Government
The full model can be summarized by equations (2), (7), (8), and (15). The
endogenous variables of the model are u, k, w, and θ . For a fixed capital stock, the
model can be solved in a recursive fashion. Equation (7) shows that the optimal
wz F k r b N =− ( ) + ( ) ++ [] 11 0 ββ θ γ ,.
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14Substituting the arbitrage equation for worker i, that is, rY
i
E = wi + s(YU – Y
i
E), and the expected
capital gain to firm i of filling a vacancy, that is, (r + s)J
i
F = FN (ki, 1) – wi – sb, yields equation (14).capital stock, k*, is determined by the rental rate of capital, that is k* = H(r + δ ),
with H  > 0. Given the capital stock, equations (8) and (15) yield equilibrium
values for θ and w, and θ , in turn, determines the equilibrium rate of unemploy-
ment (see equation (2)). Because the rate of interest is exogenously given, the
wage rate is the only price variable in the model. 
The analysis so far has implicitly assumed that the government finances the
deposit-refund system through lump-sum taxes on households. The government
cannot issue debt and does not provide unemployment benefits to workers. At
introduction, all firms having a filled job receive b from the government, so that a
lump-sum tax of T(0) = (1 – u)Lb > 0 is needed to balance the government budget
at time zero. Once the deposit-refund system is operational, job destruction leads
to net government receipts, s(1 – u)Lb, and new job matches cause net government
outlays of f(θ )uLb. Using equation (2), it can be easily shown that the deposit-
refund system is budgetary neutral in the steady state.
The model can be summarized with the aid of Figure 1. Panel (a) shows equi-
librium for labor market tightness and wages. The curve ZP represents the zero-
profit condition—see equation (8)—and is downward sloping in the (w, θ ) space.
An increase in wages makes job creation less profitable at a given level of search
cost. To restore the zero-profit equilibrium, the search cost to firms must decrease,
that is, g(θ ) must increase through a fall in θ . WS is the wage-setting curve—see
equation (15)—and is upward sloping: at higher labor market tightness the worker
receives a larger share of the search costs that are foregone when a deal is struck
with a firm. The intersection of the ZP0 and WS0 curves yields the equilibrium
point E0. In panel (b) of Figure 1, the line LMT through the origin represents the
equilibrium vacancy-unemployment ratio (the indicator for labor market tight-
ness). The curve BC is the Beveridge curve15—represented by equation (2)—
which is downward sloping and convex to the origin.16 Intuitively, when there are
less vacancies, unemployment is higher because unemployed find it more difficult
to find a job. Equilibrium vacancies and unemployment are at the intersection of
the LMT0 and BC curves.
Allocation Effects
The allocation effects of an increase in the deposit, b, are shown in Figure 1. The
appendix derives these results analytically. In panel (a), the zero profit curve shifts
up from ZP0 to ZP1 because the interest payments the firm earns on an employed
worker—a so-called implicit subsidy—increase the value of an occupied job.
These interest payments also increase wages via the wage setting equation, as
represented by an upward shift of WS0 to WS1. Both wages and the vacancy-
unemployment ratio rise; that is, the new equilibrium, E1, lies to the northeast of
the initial equilibrium E0. In panel (b), the LMT curve rotates counterclockwise
from LMT0 to LMT1, whereas the position of the Beveridge curve is unaffected by
the increase in the deposit. Given the increased equilibrium vacancy rate, unem-
DEPOSIT-REFUND ON LABOR
601
15See Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for further details on the Beveridge curve.
16Diminishing returns to inputs in the matching function cause the convex shape.ployed workers find it easier to locate a job, and hence the expected duration of an
unemployment spell falls, as does the equilibrium unemployment rate.
Efficiency and the Optimal Deposit Rate
The search model features trading externalities, implying that the decentralized
market outcome without policy intervention may be below the socially optimal
outcome. This section derives the optimal deposit-refund rate in the steady state.  
Social welfare is defined as the present discounted value of gross output minus
the sum of the social costs of employment (that is, forgone leisure), zN, search
costs of hiring firms, γ 0V, and (gross) investments, I:
(16)
where N ≡ (1 – u)L denotes aggregate employment, K ≡Σ iki is the aggregate
capital stock, and V ≡θ (L – N) denotes aggregate vacancies. The social planner
maximizes equation (16), subject to the employment constraint
N
.
= g(θ )θ (L – N)–sN, and the capital accumulation constraint, K
.
= I – δ K. The
government’s problem can be solved using Pontryagin’s maximum principle,
which yields the following optimality conditions:
(17) Fk r K
ˆ , ( ) −+ ( ) = δ 0
∧ ( ) ≡ ( ) ( ) ( ) − ( ) − ( ) ( ) − ( ) ( ) − ( ) []
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where λ is the co-state variable of the employment constraint, k
^ is the firm’s
capital-labor ratio, the hats indicate socially optimal values, and η is the (absolute)
elasticity of the function g(θ ). The condition for the capital stock, equation (17),
is similar to equation (7), reflecting the optimality of private investment decisions.





The steady-state symmetric market condition is as follows:
(21)
Matching the equations (20) and (21) yields:
(22)
If the Hosios (1990) condition—saying that η (θ ) should equal β —is satisfied, the
social optimum is obtained in which all search externalities are fully internalized.
Hence, the government should choose a zero deposit rate, rb = 0, so that θ
)
= θ .17
However, if η is smaller than β , implying that firms at the margin cause fewer
spillovers to other firms than workers cause to other employees, equilibrium





M ˆ ,. ( ) −+ = ( ) ++















S ˆ ,. ( ) −= ( ) ( ) ++


















λθ η θ γ g
)) ( ) − ( ) [] −= 10 0 ,
Fk z s g r N
ˆ , ( ) −+ − + ( ) [] =−
⋅ )) )
θγ θ θ λ λ λ 0
DEPOSIT-REFUND ON LABOR
603
17For a Cobb-Douglas matching function it is easy to show that ∂Γ /∂η <0, ∂Γ /∂θ>0 and
rdb/dθ =∂Γ /∂θ>0. In this case, η is a constant so that optimality of the market equilibrium is a knife-edge
propertyunemployment is above the efficient level. In that case, a flow subsidy at the rate
rb is needed to yield a socially optimal outcome. Conversely, if η exceeds β ,
employment should be taxed. In practice, however, it is difficult to determine
whether employment should be subsidized or taxed; it all depends on the proper-
ties of the matching function—which is hard to estimate on the basis of poorly
measured data—and stylized assumptions on the behavior of workers. 
III. Discussion18
As was pointed out earlier, deposit-refund systems may provide the same
economic incentives as pure taxes and subsidies on labor. This is evident from
the fact that the “deposit” on a hiring becomes a simple subsidy if an employer
decides not to fire an employee. Conversely, an employer that fires an
employee—who was hired before the implementation of the scheme—without
rehiring a new one has to pay a pure tax. In the steady state, when both hiring
and firing takes place, the analysis above has shown that deposit-refund
schemes on labor provide for a flow subsidy—from the government to the
firm—equal to the interest income earned on the deposit. Of course, if the real
rate of interest were zero, the net subsidy to the firm would be zero. At this
stage, it should be recognized that the qualitative allocation effects of other
fiscal intervention rules such as cuts in unemployment benefits and job-finding
bonuses are similar to the proposed deposit-refund scheme; they all reduce the
equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
How do deposit-refund schemes differ from the aforementioned instruments?
Bohm (1981) shows that environmentally motivated deposit-refund systems may
provide for stronger or more focused incentives than taxes/subsidies. For example,
if beverage containers have been littered, and thus the refund has not been collected
on them, someone else may take care of it and claim a refund, which would not
happen with a simple fee. Bottles do not necessarily need to be returned to the same
store, which increases the flexibility of the scheme. A similar argument applies to
deposit-refund schemes on labor; firm B may hire an employee who was fired by
firm A so as to cash in the “deposit.” Intuitively, the key incentive—increasing
employment—is transferred to any firm wanting to hire new people. 
Besides providing similar incentives as under taxes and subsidies, deposit-
refund schemes in the labor and environmental field avoid some of the disadvan-
tages of these alternatives. The budgetary effects of a deposit-refund may be more
attractive to policymakers than pure subsidies. Subsidies create a need for addi-
tional government funds, which often need to be raised by distortionary taxes,
whereas deposit-refund systems leave the budget intact. Once the funds are raised
to establish the deposit-refund system,19 it will operate on a budgetary neutral
Ben J.Heijdra and Jenny E.Ligthart
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18The discussion is kept informal so as to study the features of deposit-refund schemes in a wider
context than the rather stylized theoretical model.
19A generalized application of the deposit-refund scheme would require a one-off lump-sum tax at
introduction to finance ex post disbursement of employment subsidies on the current stock of workers.
Applying the scheme at the margin to targeted groups significantly saves on the budgetary outlays needed
to set up the system compared with an across-the-board application.basis in the steady state—given the assumptions set out in the theoretical section20
—because the inflow of workers matches the outflow. Such schemes fail, however,
to be budgetary neutral in steady state when firms go bankrupt: there is no way to
recoup the revenues from firing taxes on the workforce laid off. Therefore, in tran-
sition economies featuring a large share of restructuring firms, these schemes have
limited practicability as an instrument to stimulate employment. Typically, the
scheme could be applied to sectors of advanced economies in which the govern-
ment considers the rate of labor turnover to be “socially excessive” to motivate
employers to retain and train their workers. Some industries facing very uncertain
final demand patterns—mirrored in their labor demand—may need to be
exempted from the scheme. 
Bohm (1981) also argues that deposit-refund systems in the environmental
field may provide for lower information and enforcement costs. Indeed, in a
deposit-refund system on beverage containers the buyer has an incentive to prove
that the commodity has been properly disposed of so as to claim the refund. Under
a system of taxes, however, the buyer may try to circumvent the tax by disposing
of the containers in an improper fashion. A major concern with a deposit-refund
scheme on labor relates to its administrative feasibility. The scheme is easily
subject to fraud: it can only become operational under the strong assumption that
the government can distinguish quits from layoffs.21 Otherwise, a group of
workers and employers can get together at the expense of the government. For
example, an employee working at firm A quits and is subsequently rehired by firm
B, where an employee quits to be rehired by firm A. Even if quits could be distin-
guished from layoffs, the government needs to set up a monitoring system to
ensure that firms laying off people make their deposit repayments. Monitoring
costs are likely to remain limited when the number of participating firms in the
scheme is not too large. In addition, an effective penalty system must be imple-
mented to enforce compliance of firms with firing tax payments. 
Environmentally motivated deposit-refund schemes assume that the
commodity eventually needs to be disposed of in some form. In the case of labor
this is less clear, because labor may leave due factors beyond the control of the
employer. First, if mandatory retirement applies, firms employing workers up to
the retirement age could keep the subsidies received in the past on currently
retiring employees. In this way, hiring old (but less productive) workers may be
promoted. Under a flexible retirement arrangement, however, firms may have an
incentive to push old, unproductive workers into early retirement schemes to
escape the burden of the firing tax. Second, a lot of workers exit jobs through
voluntary quits, from which was abstracted in the model of Section I. If the worker
terminates the employment contract, firms enjoy a larger net benefit—they receive
a hiring subsidy without having to pay the firing tax—at the cost of higher
budgetary outlays to the government. Allowing for voluntary separations in the
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20In practice, in evaluating the budgetary implications, the government should also take into account
the saved unemployment benefits that it otherwise would have provided to unemployed workers and the
lost resources on workers who voluntarily quit.
21Unless it is also the government’s objective to penalize quits. This seems to be the aim of the scheme
applied by Tilburg University.model creates a moral hazard problem: firms may abuse workers to induce them
to quit (or even perhaps ask them to quit and share the gain with them) so that they
do not have to pay the firing tax. However, the very existence of firing taxes may
also give rise to moral hazard for employers: workers are more likely to shirk
because firing costs make it more costly for firms to fire employees. 
Besides these considerations, there are a number of other aspects, related to
the practical relevance of the deposit-refund scheme in general, that merit further
discussion. Opponents of active labor market policies argue that subsidy-tax
schemes on labor lead to rigidities in the labor market. An argument against job
security provisions (that is, a firing tax) is that firms are likely to freeze the average
size of their workforce over the business cycle—through varying working hours—
to avoid firing costs during economic downturns.22 This may delay or even cancel
the sometimes needed efficiency-enhancing restructuring in enterprises. If firms
cannot vary working hours, the deposit-refund scheme may exacerbate the varia-
tion of employment over the business cycle rather than dampening it (as is the case
with a system of only firing costs). New and growing firms are expected to expand
employment more than without the scheme because they receive the current
subsidy payments on new workers whereas the expected firing costs in the future
are discounted at a positive rate. Firing costs will not discourage hiring as long as
the subsidy payments exceed the expected present discounted value of future
firing costs. Restructuring firms, however, face immediate (undiscounted) firing
costs if they cannot vary average working hours.
The theoretical model assumed equal hiring subsidies and firing taxes. This
makes perfect sense for commodities with a high rate of turnover such as bottles
and car batteries. However, if turnover is low—in the case of labor, a worker may
be employed at a firm for more than 35 years—and deposit rates are not indexed
for inflation, it is not a priori clear whether this is an optimal strategy.23 In an infla-
tionary environment, firms receive a larger net real benefit when a match dissolves
(the real value of the firing penalty is below the real value of the hiring subsidy)
at increased net real costs to the government. Observers may claim that this
provides a rationale—in addition to voluntary quits and retirement—for a firing
tax greater than the hiring subsidy. In general, the following rule should apply: the
difference between the firing tax and the job creation subsidy must be greater than
or equal to zero; otherwise, the firm could earn unbounded returns by choosing a
very high rate of labor turnover.
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22Bertola (1990, 1992) uses a simple dynamic (partial) equilibrium model to show the stabilizing
effect of firing costs on the average level of employment. Also, Abraham and Houseman (1993) find that
German companies—which typically face stronger employment protection policies than U.S. enter-
prises—rely much more on the adjustment of average work hours, including the use of part-time work, to
reduce total labor input during recessions.
23Even though the optimal deposit rate could be determined in theory, ascertaining the optimal rate in
practice may not be an easy task because estimates of the net marginal social costs of unemployment are
not readily available. IV. Conclusion
Firms firing workers impose costs upon society in terms of unemployment bene-
fits, retraining, and other labor market measures. The formal literature on active
labor market policies has suggested using (marginal) employment subsidies or
hiring subsidies as one way to deal with the problem of unemployment. This paper
explores a new policy strategy—a subsidy-tax scheme on labor—as an alternative
to budgetary costly employment subsidy schemes. It is shown—using a simple
search-theoretic model of the labor market—that if a firm pays a tax when it fires
a worker to be reimbursed when it (re)hires that or another worker, the economy-
wide wage goes up, the natural rate of unemployment declines, and the vacancy
rate increases. Intuitively, the interest earned on the deposit during the time the
firm employs the worker acts as an implicit subsidy on hiring a new worker.
Theoretically, a deposit-refund scheme seems to be a useful policy instrument
to reduce the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but there are some limitations to
its appeal. First, it could be argued that it creates additional rigidities in the labor
market because employers may want to stabilize their average labor force—
possibly through varying the average hours worked per person—out of fear for
firing costs during downturns. Consequently, efficiency-enhancing restructuring in
firms through massive layoffs may be delayed. However, the scheme could poten-
tially be implemented at the margin—applying only to new recruits above a
certain threshold—in sectors or employment categories where governments want
to motivate employers to retain and train their employees. Second, it could create
a moral hazard: firms experiencing bad business conditions may try to push
employees into voluntarily quitting rather than firing them. However, employees
with permanent contracts may be encouraged to shirk more as firing them
becomes more costly to the firm. Third, there is no way of recouping firing taxes
from firms going through bankruptcy procedures. Finally, the deposit-refund
scheme is susceptible to fraud; because the government is unable to distinguish
quits from layoffs, firms and employees may get together at the expense of the
government. Even if the government could distinguish quits from layoffs, the
scheme is administratively demanding because a monitoring plus penalty system
needs to be in place to enforce compliance with firing tax payments. 
APPENDIX
This appendix derives the analytical results of an increase in the deposit rate. Loglinearizing equa-
tions (8) and (15), holding the rate of interest constant, yields the following system of equations:
(A.1)
where θ~ ≡ dθ /θ and η (θ ) ≡ GU / f(θ ) is the absolute value of the elasticity of the g(θ ) function









































The vacancy-unemployment ratio and wages both rise as a result of the increase in the deposit rate.
By loglinearizing the Beveridge curve (equation (2)), using θ≡ V/U, u ≡ s/(s + f ), and
f (θ ) ≡θ g(θ ), the following equation is obtained:
(A.4)
where v ~ ≡ dv/v, u ~ ≡ du/u, and s ~ ≡ ds/s. The Beveridge curve is downward sloping because
0<η (θ ) < 1. Substituting equation (A.2) in (A.4) and setting s ~ = 0 yields:
(A.5)
so that a rise in the deposit rate increases the vacancy rate.
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